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TO: AF - Mr. Moose  
THROUGH: AF - Prudence Bushnell  
FROM: AF/C - Terence P. McCulley, Acting  
SUBJECT: Relocating Rwandan Refugees -  
FAR Remnants and IGOR

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The Problem  
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Security in the Rwandan refugee camps in eastern Zaire remains a major concern: the presence of armed militia members and former Rwandan government (IGOR) officials in the camps and throughout eastern Zaire, and the concentrations of rump Rwandan armed forces (FAR) along the Goma-Bukavu axis pose problems for both the international humanitarian effort and the long term stability of Rwanda. The Government of Zaire (GOZ) has made an effort to disarm the FAR, ensure security in the camps, and interdict efforts by Hutu militants to prevent refugees from returning to Rwanda. Regrettably, the Zairians have failed in most of these areas, and have now turned to the UN and the United States for assistance.

Security in the camps, disarming ex-FAR and relocation of former Rwandan government officials and military are all interrelated -- but the problems may best be managed by treating the questions separately. The Zairians have put issues on the table which may require bilateral and multilateral solutions, and which incorporate the related issues of arrest and detention of suspected war criminals.

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Zairian Plan A: IGOR Officials  
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The GOZ wishes to separate and remove former officials of the Rwandan regime (along with their families), and to disperse them to Bandundu, Equateur and Bas Zaire provinces. The Zairians have identified 100 key figures in the former government, and have notified them of the GOZ intent. Along with hangers-on and dependents, the GOZ wishes to relocate about 1,000 persons from the camps along the sensitive border area in eastern Zaire to points west. The ultimate goal is to engineer the exit of the former officials to third countries where they might find asylum. Zairian Prime Minister Kengo has raised this issue with the UNHCR Africa Director, and requested UN assistance to prepare camps and provide transport for the former Rwandan government officials; he passed along a similar request for U.S. help to Charge Yates Wednesday.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE S. GALT

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Zairian Plan B: Remnant FAR  
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The Zairians also hope to move up to 20,000 men from the remnant Rwandan army away from the Goma - Bukavu axis. Kengo has written UNSYG Boutros-Ghali to request UN assistance to move the rump FAR, to prepare a camp for their reception, and for clothing to replace their uniforms. The Zairian PM made a similar appeal for U.S. help with the proposed relocation plan. The Zairians hope to move the FAR to a camp at Ituri, near Bunia in northeastern Zaire (just west of Lake Mobutu). Implicit in the PM's request to both the UN and the U.S. is the need to disarm the rump Rwandan army and militia prior to resettlement away from the Rwandan border. The Kengo government appears to want to do the right thing -- and yet knows that it has neither the resources nor the ability to disarm and move the former Rwandan military. Kengo has placed his government's dilemma before the U.S. and the UN, and we need to develop a response consistent with our resources and policy.

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The Easier Part: IGOR  
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The relocation of civilian authorities of the former Rwandan regime and their dependents presents an easier problem for the international community to resolve. The numbers are more manageable, and the results more immediate. Removing the leadership from the camps could curb intimidation and inflammatory propaganda, and facilitate the return to Rwanda of those refugees who desire repatriation. The UNHCR Director for Africa indicated to Charge Yates in Kinshasa, however, that his agency had no mandate to undertake such a relocation. Although moving the former interim government officials away from the main body of refugees in eastern Zaire is consistent with U.S. policy objectives in the region, providing bilateral assistance to the Zairians for such an undertaking is less clear-cut.

It is unlikely that DoD would support U.S. military involvement in the transport of the former officials, and it will be difficult to convince France or Belgium to assist the Zairians. Although a bilateral effort might be the most effective means to move the former IGOR officials, we should also press the UNHCR to assume responsibility for moving the civilians. If security in the camps can be assured (through a bilateral or multilateral force), a case can be made easily that the UNHCR should assist the Zairians with the GOZ plan to relocate the officials to three locations in western Zaire. Although the UNHCR expressed reservations at the regional director level, we should raise the issue as soon as possible with the SYG.

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The Heart of the Matter: Disarming/Relocating the FAR  
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The remnant FAR and militia present in eastern Zaire probably do not represent a military threat to the new RPF-led Rwandan government. They were routed on the field of battle by Kagame's troops, and are now for the most part bereft of heavy weapons and materiel. As long as the rump Rwandan army remains consolidated in camps along the Goma - Bukavu axis, however, it continues to pose a risk of destabilizing the new authorities in Kigali. In a more immediate sense, the force could also be used to intimidate refugees who wish to return to Rwanda. Disarming and relocating the FAR brings us back to the difficult issue of who will do the deed. Clearly the Zairians cannot, and the United States will not. The various bilateral and multilateral options discussed below outline some possible responses to the problem.

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1) Disarming/Relocating - A Bilateral Approach  
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The prospects for success in convincing a third country to send its troops to both disarm and move the FAR, and to assist the Zairians with security in the refugee camps seem dubious at best. The Moroccan example is not encouraging, and although we may wish to approach a third country (such as Israel or France) to provide troops to disarm and relocate the ex-FAR, there may be few who would be willing to take on the job. The ex-FAR remains armed (albeit lightly) with command structures intact. Although a well-disciplined third country force could likely disarm and control the ex-FAR, the risk of confrontation might deter any nation from committing troops. Additionally, such an action would ensure that the third country's troops would be widely perceived as a party to the conflict by the Hutu refugees in Zaire. Using such troops to provide security in the camps or to control the relocated ex-FAR would be problematic under these circumstances.

Given the problems related to a disarming the ex-FAR, it might be worthwhile to consider asking a third country to facilitate the relocation of the rump Rwandan army -- without disarming it -- to the camp proposed by the GOZ in far northeastern Zaire. This variation might defuse the tension which an effective move to disarm and intern the ex-FAR would engender, while removing the force from the sensitive border area. Such an action could be expected to generate criticism from the new Rwandan government in Kigali, however, unless the proposal included concrete plans to disarm at a later stage.

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## 2) Disarming/Relocating - Multilateral Options:

### -- Expand UNAMIR's Mandate?

A multilateral approach may be the most realistic option, but is far from the most expeditious way to resolve the problem. Expanding UNAMIR's mandate would require a new Security Council resolution, which in turn would lead directly to the question of where to find troops. Deployment of UNAMIR II has taken four months, and remains incomplete. Beyond this, disarming the ex-FAR and militia and assisting the GOZ with provision of security in the camps is a far different mandate from that of UNAMIR: countries now contributing troops to the Chapter VI operation in Rwanda can be expected to balk at a modification of the mandate which could raise the risk factor for their soldiers.

### -- A New Interpositional UN Force for Eastern Zaire?

The UNSYG has floated the idea of a UN "rapid reaction force," deployed in eastern Zaire, with a mandate to intervene in Burundi should fighting erupt between Tutsis and Hutus. While most on the Security Council have been decidedly tepid to this concept, we may wish to consider new UN mandated force(s) for the region to deal with the problem of the ex-FAR and security in the camps. The problem remains that a Chapter VII operation would be difficult (perhaps impossible) to pass at the UNSC. Even if passed, the UN might find few countries willing to commit troops (for the same reasons outlined above). A Chapter VI operation might be more realistic (perhaps patterned on UNSC 929, which authorized Operation Turquoise). As with the idea of expanding UNAMIR's operation, however, obtaining a new UN mandate could be a lengthy process, and in the interim, the UNHCR and other international organizations will not move the ex-FAR while they remain under arms.

## 3) Disarming/Relocating: The "For Hire" Wild Card

The most recent interagency teleconference raised -- briefly -- the idea of using mercenaries to disarm and move the ex-FAR. If no nation is willing to commit troops to undertake either or both actions, we may wish to develop this idea. The use of such troops in Africa in general, and in Zaire in particular, carries with it the images of the worst days of the 1960's, and should be approached with extreme caution.

"private security"

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"mercenary"

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image

In Africa,  
multinational corporations have successfully used private security where governments could not provide.  
(Borro in ...)

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An Added Complication: The Question of War Crimes  
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The ex-FAR and IGOR contain people guilty of genocide, and as we move forward with a War Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda we need to consider that many of those we propose to relocate may be suspected war criminals. The GOZ may have an international obligation to arrest and detain suspected war criminals, but has scant means and little will to undertake such an initiative. The bilateral or multilateral force would then face the thorny issue of whether to get involved in the detention of war criminals.

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Preliminary Conclusions: Squaring the Circle  
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Providing security in the refugee camps in eastern Zaire and relocating/disarming the ex-FAR may require two separate operations. The former could be accomplished under a Chapter VI operation, while the latter would likely require Chapter VII authority. Both actions will face lengthy debate to achieve some consensus at the UN (even if the camp security issue is folded into an enlarged geographic mandate for UNAMIR II), and appropriate Council resolutions followed by deployment of multinational forces to Zaire cannot be assured. Bilateral action would address the dual problems more quickly, but finding third countries willing to commit troops, particularly for disarmament, will be difficult, if not impossible.

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The Motives of the Zairians  
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The Zairians have sent signals for some time that the scale of the crisis in eastern Zaire exceeds the ability of the government to cope. The Kengo government has cooperated fully with Operation Support Hope, but has been often powerless to extend its writ to control local civil and military authorities in eastern Zaire. The Government of Zaire's current request for UN and U.S. assistance is likely an attempt to resolve a major and debilitating domestic crisis and at the same time obtain international legitimacy to bolster the Prime Minister against Mobutu. Mobutu's agenda is unclear at this point, and we should be careful to ensure that whatever solution we support does not work to end Mobutu's isolation. While Mobutu's tacit approval will be required to deploy a bilateral or multilateral force to Zaire, we should continue to work with the government of Prime Minister Kengo. Bolstering Kengo and disarming and relocating the ex-FAR and separating the Hutu extremist leadership from the larger refugee population remain the objectives of U.S. policy; tangible support for the former and a rapid solution to the latter remain problematic.

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